

**Top Secret**



**Twenty-Fifth Report**

**COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS  
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS**

**(This report covers the period from  
7 August through 13 August 1973)**

*This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the  
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.*

NSA review completed

DIA review(s)  
completed.

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14 August 1973

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14 August 1973

Twenty-Fifth Report

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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS\*

(This report covers the week from  
7 August through 13 August 1973)

The Key Points

- For the second week in a row, no new North Vietnamese personnel were detected beginning the infiltration trip south.
- North Vietnamese logistic activity was at a very low rainy season level in Laos and at a moderate level in southern North Vietnam. Both military and civilian logistic movements, however, continued at a high pace in Communist-controlled areas of northern South Vietnam.
- Combat activity was at a low level during the week in both South Vietnam and Laos.

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The Details

NOTE: This is the twenty-fifth in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

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I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies

A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments

1. For the second consecutive week, no new North Vietnamese personnel--either combat troops or specialists--were detected beginning the infiltration trip south. Consequently, our estimate of the number of North Vietnamese personnel who have started south since 15 June--about 5,000 men--remains unchanged. Of this total, some 4,000 have been combat troops while the remainder have been civilian and military specialists. Since the original settlement agreement was signed on 27 January, more than 55,000 North Vietnamese have infiltrated south. Over 30,000 of these started their journey since the ceasefire date and the other 25,000 were in the pipeline traveling southward as of 27 January. (Annex B, [redacted] contains a more detailed discussion of the information pertaining to infiltration received during the past week.)

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## Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam

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## South Vietnam

## Regular Combat Forces

| VC/NVA <sup>1</sup> | RVNAF <sup>2</sup> | VC/NVA             | RVNAF    |
|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------|
| 172,000             | 287,000            | 83,000             | 85,000   |
|                     |                    | 325th              | VNMC     |
|                     |                    | 324B               | Airborne |
|                     |                    | 320B               | 1st      |
|                     |                    | 312th <sup>3</sup> | 2nd      |
|                     |                    | 304th              | 3rd      |
|                     |                    | 711th              | Regional |
|                     |                    | 2nd                | Forces   |

1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat support, and air defense units and local force companies and platoons.

2. Revised RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes present for duty personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions.


3. The headquarters and divisional support units are currently located deep within North Vietnam.

## MR 3

| VC/NVA               | RVNAF           |
|----------------------|-----------------|
| 32,000               | 67,000          |
| 429th Sapper Command | 25th            |
| 9th                  | 18th            |
| 7th                  | 5th             |
| 5th                  | Regional Forces |

## MR 4

| VC/NVA | RVNAF                      |
|--------|----------------------------|
| 28,000 | 78,000                     |
| 1st    | 21st                       |
|        | 9th                        |
|        | 7th                        |
|        | 44th Special Tactical Zone |
|        | Regional Forces            |



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## B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies

### North Vietnam

2. Logistic movements in the Vinh area and the southern Panhandle of North Vietnam remained at moderate levels during the week. Good evidence indicates that on 3 August, some 65 tons of assorted ammunition were sent from a logistic unit west of Vinh to another unit in Quang Binh Province. On 6 August about 25 tons of ordnance were shipped to the same unit. [redacted]

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[redacted] plans are also in effect to move over 400 tons of ordnance to two storage facilities in the Vinh area during the remainder of August.

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3. In the southern Panhandle, much of the logistic activity observed between Quang Khe and the DMZ also involved the shipment of ammunition. As of 6 August, the principal NVA logistic unit in Quang Binh Province had nearly 100 tons of ammunition on hand at one storage area and an additional 100 tons awaiting transshipment. [redacted] 25 northbound and 32 southbound vehicles were observed crossing a ferry on the Troc River southwest of Quang Khe. On 7 and 8 August, over 750 tons of foodstuffs were observed at a storage area in the southern Quang Binh Province area. Finally, [redacted]


[redacted] over 200 tons of ammunition, mostly AAA rounds, had been received by a logistic unit south of Quang Khe over an unspecified but recent period.

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### Laos and Cambodia

4. Communist logistic activity in southern Laos was practically non-existent during the week, and heavy rains have apparently closed most lines of communication. In spite of the weather, however, North Vietnamese units are continuing road construction work in the central Laotian Panhandle. As of late July, road repair work was in progress on Routes 911 and 91 in the area west of Tchepone. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers mentioned in this report.) On 6 August, some 30

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NVA supply vehicles were observed carrying road surfacing material to an unlocated unit in the central Panhandle.

### South Vietnam

5. Communist logistic movements along the new "western supply corridor" inside South Vietnam were again very heavy during the week. [redacted]

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[redacted] some 250 tons of cargo had been received by subordinate elements of the major NVA logistic headquarters operating on the western corridor. On 2 August, an NVA storage depot on Route 548 had over 5,200 tons of supplies on hand, about 80 percent which was identified as rice, and on the same day another NVA unit in the area received 25 cargo vehicles transporting nearly 100 tons of rice. On 5 August, over 200 supply vehicles carrying some 650 tons of supplies (mostly rice and other food products) were observed on route 548. On the following day, at least 170 tons of cargo were received by units in the same area, and over 9,000 tons of cargo were reportedly in storage at two of the major storage facilities along the supply corridor. Finally, on 7 August, 62 cargo trucks were observed on Route 6089 south of Khe Sanh.

6. There were also substantial movements of cargo in other Communist-held regions of northern South Vietnam during the week. On 7 August, 61 supply vehicles were detected on Route 9 between Dong Ha and the Laos/South Vietnam border. On the following day, 13 trucks were seen on the same route between the Laos/South Vietnam border and the junction with Route 6088. In addition some 50 cargo vehicles were observed moving daily through the operating area of an NVA logistic unit near the Cua Viet River in northeastern Quang Tri Province.

## II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos

### A. South Vietnam

7. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by





the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, 15 June, and for the last week (7 Aug - 13 Aug) are shown below:

| Military<br>Region | Total Since 27<br>January "Ceasefire" |        | Total Since 15<br>June "Ceasefire" |       | Last Week<br>(7-13 Aug) |                     |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|--------|------------------------------------|-------|-------------------------|---------------------|
|                    | Major                                 | Minor  | Major                              | Minor | Major                   | Minor               |
| MR 1               | 1,133                                 | 3,907  | 108                                | 548   | 14                      | 97                  |
| MR 2               | 393                                   | 2,726  | 129                                | 872   | 28                      | 119                 |
| MR 3               | 500                                   | 3,432  | 98                                 | 856   | 10                      | 86                  |
| MR 4               | 851                                   | 7,971  | 173                                | 1,805 | 15                      | 204                 |
| Totals             | 2,877                                 | 18,036 | 508                                | 4,081 | 67 (80)                 | 506 (554) <u>1/</u> |

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

8. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the charts on the following pages, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion.

#### B. Laos


9. Communist-initiated combat activity in Laos remained at a low level during the reporting period. In extreme south-eastern Military Region 2 of northern Laos a government position was unsuccessfully attacked by two enemy companies. The remainder of the enemy actions were scattered in southern Laos in Military Region 4.

(See Reverse Side of Page)



# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF






(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)





# CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



TOTAL VIOLATIONS  
 MAJOR VIOLATIONS

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### III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina

#### Further Analysis of Recent Satellite Photography over North Vietnam

10. [REDACTED]

photography over the northern half of North Vietnam have generally confirmed the preliminary analysis presented in our report of last week [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] We have still detected no new shipments of weapons or munitions from China or the Soviet Union in this photography. As we reported last week, rail activity between Hanoi and the Chinese border was observed to be at quite high levels. On the Chinese side of the border, however, rail traffic at P'ing-hsiang appeared to be lower than average on the specific dates of the photography. The count of vehicles in the major truck parks located between Dong Dang and the Kep-Thai Nguyen areas has now reached nearly 5,000 units (mostly cargo trucks), more than double the number seen in the same areas [REDACTED] Haiphong port appears to be operating normally, but with some limitations due to silting. Twenty-two merchant ships were observed in the port and anchorage area. Continuing readout of the mission confirms [REDACTED] that the reconstruction of port facilities is continuing at a modest pace.

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#### Communists in Southern South Vietnam Receive New Communications Equipment

11. [REDACTED]

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the SVNLA received about 300 tons of communications equipment from North Vietnam. [REDACTED] an additional 200 tons was expected to arrive during 1973. Included in the equipment already received were two communications vehicles equipped with 220 watt radio sets, three vehicles with 250 watt radios, two with 400 watt radios, and two with 1,000 watt sets.

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12. This equipment would markedly improve the quality and range of SVNLA's long distance communications. The most powerful radios now used by Communist forces in southern South Vietnam have a rating of 15 watts. In addition to the communications vehicles, large quantities of additional radios (1, 2, and 15 watts), telephones, cables, batteries, switchboards, and repair equipment were included in the shipments sent south. The communications vehicles with highpowered radios will reportedly be used by the Signal Office and Headquarters of SVNLA, while most of the remaining equipment will be distributed to the Communist division-sized units and Viet Cong military regional commands in southern South Vietnam.

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## ANNEX B

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese  
Personnel to the South

No regular or special-purpose infiltration groups were detected in the pipeline during the past week. Table 1 below shows the infiltration of combat troops since 1 September 1972, by destination, while Table 2 summarizes total infiltration starts--including specialists--since 1 January 1973.

Table 1

Infiltration Starts: Combat Troops  
Leaving North Vietnam for the South,  
by Destination\*

|                          | <u>1 Sep 1972-30 Jun 1973**</u> | <u>1 Jul-13 Aug 1973</u> |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Total                    | <u>94,000</u>                   | <u>3,100</u>             |
| MR Tri-Thien-Hue         | 33,000 (CIA) , 36,000 (DOD)     | 0                        |
| MR 5                     | 9,000                           | 3,100                    |
| B-3 Front                | 14,000 (CIA) , 11,000 (DOD)     | 0                        |
| COSVN                    | 26,000                          | 0                        |
| Southern Laos and MR 559 | 12,000                          | 0                        |

\* This table includes only combat infiltration groups, and omits special-purpose groups. There are minor differences between the DOD and the CIA concerning the number of personnel destined for specific areas listed on this table. Where such differences exist both the CIA and the DOD estimates are given.

\*\* For accounting purposes, we arbitrarily define the "infiltration year" as beginning on 1 September, which roughly coincides with the start of the dry season along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Laos Panhandle each year.



Table 2

Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline  
Since 1 January 1973

|             | <u>Total<sup>1/</sup></u> | <u>Special-Purpose</u> |
|-------------|---------------------------|------------------------|
| January     | 20,000                    | 1,600                  |
| February    | 10,200                    | 2,100                  |
| March       | 3,250                     | 2,250                  |
| April       | 1,925                     | 1,200                  |
| May         | 7,175                     | 300                    |
| June 1-15   | 825                       | 325                    |
| June 16-30  | 1,375                     | 375                    |
| July 1-15   | 1,900                     | 175                    |
| July 16-31  | 1,750                     | 425                    |
| August 1-6  | 0                         | 0                      |
| August 7-13 | 0                         | 0                      |

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<sup>1/</sup> Including gap-filled groups, except groups 7001-7009 and 5057. Assuming that these groups departed after 1 January, about 5,000 combat troops would be added to the infiltration starts shown above.

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